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Strategies of pro-EU parties in the face of a Eurosceptic challenge  
	
 
Introduction 
During the last decade, almost all countries within the EU have experienced the emergence of 
Eurosceptic parties. These parties have won 113 out of 751 seats in the 2014 European Par-
liament elections. Their unprecedented success was fuelled by the ongoing crisis of the EU 
regarding bailout, the threat of a Eurozone breakdown, growing state debts, the instability of 
the banking system and disputed austerity measures. Thus, Eurosceptic parties have become a 
challenge for those parties that have integrated Europe for decades.  
 
This article seeks to describe how pro-European parties strategically communicate when fac-
ing this Eurosceptic challenge and how this affects the politicization of EU integration in each 
of the examined countries. Our description of pro-European parties’ strategic behaviour grants 
special attention to pro-European catch-all parties, especially to those struggling with internal 
dissent regarding EU integration, as it is these large, vote-winning parties that strongly shape 
societal debates.  
 
Our study contributes to research in a three-fold manner. First, we focus on the strategic inter-
actions of parties (for this research desiderate, e.g. Kriesi, 2008) by analysing how pro-EU 
parties communicate when facing a Eurosceptic challenge. In this analysis we depart from 
research focusing predominantly on Eurosceptics. Instead, Eurosceptic parties in our study 
serve as a comparative baseline to identify the strategies of pro-EU parties. Second, drawing 
on Meguid (2005) and Bale et al. (2010), we further elaborate on the strategic repertoire that 
parties have at hand. Third, we link strategic party behaviour to EU politicization in a country. 
We thereby show that parties’ communication strategies regarding topics, issues and positions 
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directly affect the core components of politicization. Politicization within a country occurs if 
(a) salience is attached to the topic of EU integration; (b) parties enter a common debate about 
the same aspects of EU integration and (c) polarized opinions are voiced.  
 
Our focus on party elites’ strategic behaviour and the resulting elite politicization towards EU 
integration seems justified as research has shown that it is elites who (partially) shape public 
opinions about EU integration (Gabel and Scheve, 2007), who impact the extent to which 
voters rely on EU considerations in European Parliament elections (Hobolt and Spoon, 2012) 
and who strongly influence mass media coverage about the integration project (Adam, 2007). 
 
To answer our research question on the communication of pro-European parties when facing a 
Eurosceptic challenge, we first describe the strategic repertoire that pro-European parties have 
at hand and develop hypotheses on how this repertoire is used by pro-European parties in 
general and by pro-European catch-all parties facing strong internal dissent. Second, we illus-
trate how party strategies can be analysed by means of quantitative content analysis of press 
releases in the run-up to the 2014 EP elections in seven countries (Austria, France, Germany, 
Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom) and operationalize relevant party 
classifications based on secondary data. In a third step, we present the results concerning par-
ties’ strategic behaviour in the run-up to the 2014 elections. We then show how these strategic 
decisions influence a country’s politicization.  
 
Party strategies in the face of a Eurosceptic challenge 
The general assumption backed by empirical support is that Eurosceptic parties challenge pro-
European parties by putting new issues and new positions regarding the EU (namely negative 
evaluations) on the agenda to ‘upset the dominant party alignment’ (Carmines and Stimson, 
1993: 154; for empirical evidence, e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Parsons and Weber, 2011). 
	
	
However, as research has shown that no party has monopolistic agenda control (e.g. Adam 
and Maier, 2016; Steenbergen and Scott, 2004), pro-European parties have to make strategic 
decisions regarding how to respond.  
 
Pro-EU parties’ strategic repertoire 
Two dimensions of parties’ strategic decisions are distinguished in the literature (Green-
Pedersen, 2007). First, parties have to decide which issues to emphasize, e.g. whether to stress 
immigration or the welfare state (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996). Second, they have 
to decide which positions to make salient (Downs, 1957), meaning that they side, for exam-
ple, with a state that promotes public welfare to a lesser or greater degree. However, whenev-
er we deal with multi-dimensional topics—one of the most prominent examples being EU 
integration (Green-Pedersen, 2011; Hurrelmann, Gora and Wagner, 2013)—it is not sufficient 
to distinguish two dimensions of party strategies as proposed in the literature. The topic of EU 
integration consists of a multitude of different issues: immigration, the economy, foreign af-
fairs and constitutional questions (to name just a few) can all be discussed with reference to 
EU integration. As a consequence, we propose to differentiate the emphasis dimension of stra-
tegic party communication. First, a party strategically decides whether it makes reference at 
all to the broader topic of EU integration. Second, a party then selects specific aspects within 
the broader topic of EU integration. We label these aspects issues. They indicate whether a 
party gets involved in debates about, for example, immigration, austerity measures or foreign 
affairs in relation to EU integration. A party thereby strategically decides not only about the 
issue discussed but also whether to mention that it is related to the EU. We regard this distinc-
tion as crucial as it allows us to understand not only to which degree parties put Europe on the 
agenda, but also whether by doing so they enter a common debate or talk past each other as 
every party selectively emphasizes issues that are advantageous to itself (e.g. Petrocik, 1996). 
	
	
Based on these considerations, we conceive a three-dimensional strategy repertoire of parties 
consisting of a topic, an issue and a position dimension. 
 
For each dimension, pro-EU parties have to decide on the specific strategies they wish to em-
ploy. For the topic dimension, parties have to decide whether they want to emphasize the 
broader topic of EU integration at all or strategically decide to refer to the nation state. We 
call the former strategy an ‘agenda-building strategy’, whereas the latter is labelled a ‘silenc-
ing strategy’. If pro-EU parties employ agenda-building strategies, they must then make deci-
sions about the issue as well as the position. 
 
Concerning the issue dimension, pro-EU parties have two options: they may either try to shift 
the debate towards those issues of EU integration from which they can profit and thus raise 
EU issues distinct from those raised by Eurosceptic parties (‘strategy of distinct issue empha-
sis’), or they emphasize issues similar to those raised by the Eurosceptics in order to prevent 
Eurosceptics from monopolizing sensitive issues (‘strategy of similar issue emphasis’).  
 
Finally, for the position dimension, pro-EU parties have three strategic options: they may de-
fend their pro-EU position consistent with the traditional party line (‘hold strategy’); leave 
their position and adopt EU-critical stances of Eurosceptic parties (‘adoption strategy’) or blur 
their position towards the EU by either avoiding to formulate positions at all or by formulat-
ing ambivalent statements (‘blurring strategy’).1 
 
Figure 1 visualizes pro-EU parties’ strategic repertoire based on the aforementioned three 
dimensions (topic, issue and position) containing seven strategic choices. The figure makes 
clear that as soon as an agenda-building strategy has been chosen for the topic dimension, 
different strategic choices can be combined.  
	
	
 
# Figure 1 about here # 
 
This three-dimensional strategic party repertoire partly mirrors the strategic options which 
have been ascribed to pro-European parties to meet the Eurosceptic challenge (Bale et al., 
2010; Meguid, 2005): pro-European parties may either opt for silencing strategies shifting 
attention to national topics or they may turn into topic followers. As such, they may mimic the 
Eurosceptics’ position resulting in adoption strategies or they may defend their own pro-EU 
positions. These four strategies identified in the literature deal with both the topic and posi-
tional level of our strategic party repertoire. We have extended this strategic repertoire in a 
two-fold manner: first, by bringing in the idea of position blurring, we have added an im-
portant positional strategy which allows parties ‘to misrepresent the distance between the par-
ty and its potential voters’ (Rovny, 2012: 273). Second, adding the issue level opens up two 
additional strategic options for parties, i.e. the distinct or similar issue emphasis. This new 
dimension allows us to show whether parties talk past each other or not.  
 
Hypotheses and research question regarding pro-EU parties’ strategic repertoire 
We first turn to the topic dimension of parties’ strategic choices. Pro-EU parties have been 
shown to often apply silencing strategies, whereas Eurosceptics act as agenda-setters (e.g. 
Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Parsons and Weber, 2011) for at least three reasons: (1) pro-EU 
parties often struggle with internal party disagreement on EU integration (Ferrara and 
Weishaupt, 2004); (2) they fear losing voters who are normally mobilized on a left-right di-
mension (Eijk and Franklin, 2004) and (3) they are afraid of losing control over their cam-
paign agenda due to the multidimensionality of EU integration (Green-Pedersen, 2011). Con-
sequently, we expect: 
	
	
H1a: Pro-European parties rely more strongly on silencing strategies regarding the topic of 
EU integration compared to Eurosceptic parties.  
 
However, this divide between Eurosceptics and pro-European parties in setting Europe on the 
agenda has recently been shown to depend on the degree of dissent about Europe within pro-
European governing parties (van de Wardt et al., 2014): if pro-European governing parties are 
internally united on the topic of EU integration, Eurosceptic opposition parties refrain from 
bringing it up and the governing parties turn into agenda-builders. It is only if dissent prevails 
within pro-European government parties that these parties de-mobilize and Eurosceptics use 
the issue to exploit the cracks. The article extends this argument to catch-all parties in general 
since all of them (as well as those in opposition) are not only likely to take over government 
responsibility but, due to their heterogeneous party base, are also more likely to face internal 
dissent compared to smaller pro-European parties (for the relevance of party size, see Wil-
liams and Spoon, 2015). Beyond, such parties are crucial for shaping the overall societal de-
bate. Consequently, it is catch-all parties (in government and opposition) whose cracks are 
potentially exploited by Eurosceptic parties and whose own communication is guided by their 
internal dissent. We expect:  
H1b: Pro-EU catch-all parties with strong internal dissent rely more strongly on silencing 
strategies regarding the topic of EU integration compared to internally united catch-all 
parties.  
 
Less is known about the question whether pro-EU parties emphasize their own selective is-
sues regarding EU integration or whether they campaign on the same issues as Eurosceptic 
parties. In earlier years, researchers have claimed that parties in all elections talk past each 
other—each of them emphasizing the issues on which they are judged competent (Petrocik, 
1996). However, more and more research questions the general validity of the selective em-
	
	
phasis thesis (e.g. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010; Sigelman and Buell, 2004). Rather, 
it seems that parties observe their issue environments and react accordingly. Discussing the 
same issues as other parties is very important for the following reasons: parties are expected 
to have a position on all issues. Furthermore, ignorance of an issue implies that they pass on 
shaping the positional struggle (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010), and they run the risk 
of being accused of inactivity (Van Noije et al., 2008). As research has produced evidence 
that parties emphasize their own as well as shared issues in election campaigns in general and, 
to our knowledge, there is no such study that has analysed this question in the course of EP 
elections, we refrain from formulating hypotheses but instead pose the following research 
question: Do pro-European parties employ a strategy of emphasizing distinct or similar issues 
in reaction to Eurosceptic parties?  
 
Finally, hardly any research has been conducted regarding pro-EU parties’ decisions to hold 
or shift their position when dealing with the Eurosceptic challenge. Some first evidence, how-
ever, points towards the predominance of hold strategies. Looking at campaign material in EP 
elections, Adam et al. (2013) found that pro-EU parties advance their positions most forceful-
ly in those countries in which Eurosceptics voice strong criticism. Bale et al. (2010) stress the 
difficulty and danger of adoption strategies towards the populist right. The relevance of hold 
strategies is also underlined by De Sio and Weber (2014) who claim that position change 
(‘adoption strategy’) is a costly strategy for parties likely to result in alienating voters. As a 
consequence, we expect: 
H2a:  Pro-European parties choose hold strategies over adoption strategies and thus voice 
positions that are distinct from those of Eurosceptic parties. 
 
However, forcefully defending their pro-European positions might be especially challenging 
for those pro-European parties that face strong internal dissent on matters of EU integration as 
	
	
this elite dissent is likely to be reflected in the electorate of a party. In this case, clear-cut pro-
European positions might alienate part of the electorate. As a consequence, parties may ad-
here to two positional strategies: first, they may avoid making dissent visible at all, which 
results in blurring strategies, i.e. the avoidance of EU evaluations or the formulation of am-
bivalent statements. Second, it is also such internally divided parties for which the likelihood 
of adoption strategies increases (compared to internally united parties). Adoption strategies 
occur if a party judged pro-European by experts publicly communicates only ‘lukewarm’ 
support or anti-EU positions.  
 
Adoption strategies thus do not necessarily require a black-white divide of a party’s position 
and its communication. A position-wise clear-cut pro-European party can instead take up 
parts of the Eurosceptic rhetoric and combine it with traditional pro-European stances on oth-
er issue fields in other parts of its public communication. By doing this, it already applies 
adoption strategies as it departs from its attributed pro-European party line (as judged by ex-
perts) communicating only ‘lukewarm’ support. We thus expect:  
H2b: Pro-European catch-all parties with strong internal dissent are more likely to choose 
adoption and blurring strategies compared to internally united catch-all parties.   
 
Parties’ strategies as shapers of a country’s EU politicization  
Pro-European parties’ strategic behaviour affects the degree and form of the EU’s elite politi-
cization in each country. Generally speaking, politicization is a process that results in public 
debate about a political issue. In the last decade an abundant literature has focused on politici-
zation processes and their outcomes, in particular related to the European Union (e.g. 
Koopmans and Statham, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2008; Hutter and Grande, 2014). Our starting 
point is De Wilde’s (2011: 566f.) definition of politicization as ‘an increase in polarization of 
opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards poli-
	
	
cy formulation within the EU’. From this perspective, EU politicization has three characteris-
tics: the large range of opinions voiced, their visibility and their relevance for policy formula-
tion. Policies are normally formulated as answers to specific issues, i.e. societal conflicts 
about specific policy questions. We thus conclude that to make (contrasting) opinions relevant 
for policy formulation, they should be voiced in the same issue area. It is only if parties share 
a common issue focus that the various opinions voiced can be meaningfully connected to each 
other. EU politicization thus means that (a) a large range of opinions is voiced regarding EU 
integration; (b) that these opinions are meaningfully related because they focus on the same 
issues and (c) that they become visible (also see Hutter and Grande, 2014).  
 
The main contribution to the politicization literature is that we link EU politicization to its 
strategic and behavioural origins. In this vein, topic visibility, issue focus and range of opin-
ions are not only the crucial components of elite politicization but also the crucial dimensions 
of party strategies. Full politicization, therefore, requires that actors (a) avoid silencing strate-
gies, (b) are willing to emphasize similar issues (strategy of similar issue emphasis) and (c) 
that pro-EU parties choose hold strategies voicing opinions that contradict those of the Euro-
sceptics. Politicization in this respect becomes the aggregate outcome of actors’ strategic de-
cisions regarding topics, issues and positions.  
 
Data, Operationalizations and Methods 
To study parties’ strategies and the resulting politicization, we focus on parties’ campaign 
communication in the run-up to the 2014 EP elections in seven countries, namely Austria, 
France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. We have cho-
sen these countries because they are all confronted by the Eurosceptic challenge as indicated 
by expert judgments of party stances on EU integration in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(CHES) collected for the year 2014 (Bakker et al., 2015). All parties that score below 3 on a 
	
	
scale from 1 to 7 were rated as Eurosceptic (see the online appendix), while pro-European 
parties are all rated above 5 on the EU integration scale. These countries also vary in the de-
gree of dissent among pro-European catch-all parties, which are defined as all parties that won 
more than 20 percent in the last national election and have a clear-cut pro-EU stance. Howev-
er, two of these large parties—the British Conservatives and Syriza in Greece (see the online 
appendix) — must be regarded as border-line cases since they are neither clear-cut pro- nor 
anti-European. To study the degree of dissent on EU integration, we rely on CHES data where 
each party was classified by experts regarding their degree of internal dissent.  
 
For the analysis of parties’ strategic communication, we rely on press releases. We chose 
press releases over other traditional means of party communication (e.g. parliamentary ques-
tioning, manifestos) for three reasons: first, they are quite independent from fixed schedules 
(e.g. parliamentary questionings) and other external events and thus allow the direct observa-
tion of a party’s strategic behaviour; and second, they are instruments geared towards the me-
dia and thus allow the observation of a party’s public instead of internal (e.g. manifestos) 
communication. Finally, we opted for press releases instead of any forms of online campaign 
communication because parties still vary considerably regarding their online activity (Stetka, 
Lilleker, Tenscher and Jalali, 2014).  
 
We considered all press releases issued by parties that participated in the 2014 EP elections 
and won at least three percent of the votes in the 2009 EP or the respective last national elec-
tion. We analysed all press releases twelve weeks preceding the 2014 EP elections.	As we are 
interested in party strategies towards Europe and the resulting EU politicization, we sampled  
press releases based on an electronic search string2 that made reference to European policies, 
European institutions, European politicians and/or the EP elections at least twice. This search 
resulted in a total of 936 press releases for Austria, 180 for France, 301 for Germany, 518 for 
	
	
Greece, 178 for the Netherlands, 322 for Portugal and 223 for the United Kingdom. 
 
To systematically analyse the content of the press releases, we rely on a quantitative content 
analysis based on a detailed codebook (Maier et al., 2014). All eight coders mutually partici-
pated in a comprehensive eleven-day-long training program followed by a (researcher-coder) 
reliability test of 25 press releases each to ensure the reliability of coding. We tested for relia-
bility of coding using the Holsti formula as well as Krippendorff’s Alpha coefficient whenev-
er possible or useful. With average results for formal categories (e.g. date of publishing, 
source, country etc.) of 0.98–1.00 according to the Holsti formula and 0.97–1.00 according to 
Krippendorff’s Alpha, and reliabilities for content characteristics (e.g. main issue, evaluation 
of the EU etc.) of 0.77– 0.88 (Holsti formula) and 0.62–0.83 (Krippendorff’s Alpha) across 
the countries, reliability tests delivered satisfactory results.3 
 
This content analysis allows us to operationalize topic, issue and positional strategies and the 
resulting dimensions of politicization. To analyse topic strategies and the resulting visibility 
of EU integration, we measure the salience that parties attach to EU integration by looking at 
the amount of EU-related press releases in proportion to all published press releases. To oper-
ationalize the issue strategy and the resulting distinct or shared issue focus, we look at the 
main issue covered in a press release. Altogether, we distinguish 17 issue categories (Maier et 
al., 2014). Based on the relative frequencies of these issue categories per party, we calculate 
the Duncan index of dissimilarity for each pair of parties (Duncan and Duncan, 1955). This 
index takes a value between 0 and 1, which can be conveniently interpreted as the percentage 
of a party X’s communication that has to be shifted to other issues in order to have an identi-
cal issue emphasis as party Y.4 To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we subtract the 
original Duncan dissimilarity index score from 1. The resulting issue similarity score ranges 
	
	
between 0 (= different emphasis) and 1 (= same emphasis) and thus can be interpreted as a 
distance measure between parties based on their issue emphasis.  
 
For the operationalization of the positional strategy and the resulting range of opinions 
voiced, we analyse how each party evaluates the general idea of European integration (IN-
TEGEVAL) and how it evaluates the more specific functioning of the EU today, including its 
institutions, politicians and policies (EUEVAL). Both indicators differentiate between four 
categories: positive, negative, balanced (as many positive as negative evaluations) and no 
evaluation. Based on these variables, we derive information on the frequency of EU evalua-
tions and of balanced statements (blurring strategy) and on the evaluation as such (hold or 
adoption strategies). For the former, we analyse the share of EU-related press releases that 
contain no clear-cut position on the general idea and / or the more specific functioning of the 
EU (position not available at all or balanced statement); for the latter, we build one EU evalu-
ation index per party based on those press releases that contain a clear-cut evaluation. This 
index ranges from -1 (strong Euroscepticism) to +1 (strong EU support).5 It should be noted 
that this index gives more weight to evaluations referring to the idea of European integration 
in general than to evaluations of specific policies or institutions. To finally identify adoption 
or hold strategies we compare a party’s communication index with its general position on EU 
integration as judged by experts in the CHES survey (Bakker et al., 2015). We speak of adop-
tion, if a party judged pro-European (neutral towards Europe) applies only ‘lukewarm’ sup-
port or even anti-EU rhetoric in its communication.  
 
We conduct analyses for each country separately, which allows us to describe the strategic 
choices disaggregated to even single parties. We thereby depart from a classical regression 
logic which would analyse all parties of all countries together searching for the general effect 
of party or country characteristics on strategic party behaviour. We have opted for this de-
	
	
tailed description as we aim to show possible heterogeneity within countries and party types. 
However, this very detailed description of party strategies per country is accompanied by an 
eschewal of controlling for explanations that go beyond the factors focused on here (namely 
party position and internal party dissent). Such alternative explanations might either be found 
on the party level (e.g. electoral success or government participation) or on the country level 
(e.g. electoral cycle or general issue agenda). We opted for this descriptive approach due to 
the scope of this article and the small case numbers which are a result of our country-specific 
strategy of analyses  
 
We apply network methods (e.g. Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2013) to these country-
specific analyses. We do so as network analysis was developed to deal with the interrelations 
between observations instead of regarding them as independent from each other. This is cru-
cial because the core assumption of our article is that parties’ strategies within a country are 
closely intertwined. Thus we claim that pro-European parties are indeed affected by the Euro-
sceptic challenge.  
 
To apply network analysis, we convert our core variables (position of party towards EU inte-
gration; communication regarding topic, issue and EU evaluation) into a dyadic variable (e.g. 
Borgatti et al., 2013). A dyadic variable does not describe the attribute of a party as such, but 
rather the difference between each pair of parties. Looking, for example, at the positions of 
two parties towards EU integration (A = 1.5; B = 6), from a dyadic perspective we would ask 
whether the difference between party A and B (delta = 4.5) could explain differences in topic 
focus. We thus test whether differences of parties regarding their position towards EU integra-
tion are related to general differences in (1) parties’ topic emphasis, (2) their issue focus and 
(3) their EU evaluations. To do so, we rely on Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) corre-
lations using the Program UCINET. QAP is designed to correlate dyadic variables calculating 
	
	
statistical associations such as Pearson’s r. It thereby calculates significance by permutation 
tests in which it compares the observed correlation with those resulting from thousands of 
randomly created matrices (e.g. Borgatti et al., 2013)—a method that does not require inde-
pendent observations.  
 
Results  
Topic dimension: Agenda-building or silencing strategies of pro-EU parties? 
To test whether pro-EU parties as such attach less salience to the topic of EU integration (si-
lencing strategies) compared to Eurosceptics (H1), we look at the share of press releases 
which contain a reference to Europe in relation to all press releases published per party and 
convert this information into a dyadic relation to test whether differences in parties’ EU posi-
tions are associated with differences in the salience parties attach to the topic of EU integra-
tion.  
 
The QAP correlations shown in Table 1 lead us to reject the idea that pro-European parties as 
such adhere more strongly to silencing strategies compared to Eurosceptics (H1a). This is 
indicated by the non-significant results in Table 1. It is only in Germany that pro- and anti-EU 
parties differ on the topic dimension, with pro-European parties relying more strongly on si-
lencing strategies compared to Eurosceptics (see the online appendix). In Germany it is the 
newly founded AfD, a Eurosceptic right-wing party, which devotes around 43 percent of their 
press releases to Europe compared to the other parties that only devote between 20 to 24 per-
cent to the EU.  
 
# Table 1 about here # 
 
	
	
The analysis so far merely indicates that there is not a general divide between pro- and anti-
EU parties on the topic dimension in six out of seven countries. However, this general finding 
does not preclude the possibility that specific pro-EU parties adhere to silencing strategies. 
H1b assumes that pro-EU catch-all parties with strong internal dissent are more likely to em-
ploy silencing strategies compared to united pro-EU catch-all parties. Indeed, a close-up view 
of our data lends support to this idea. It is not catch-all parties as such, but those that are in-
ternally divided that are most likely to employ silencing strategies. Silencing is applied heavi-
ly by the divided French catch-all parties (UMP, 9 percent; dissent: 5.8; PS, 15 percent, dis-
sent 6.8), by British parties (Labour: 7 percent, dissent: 3.6, Conservatives [although this par-
ty is balanced rather than pro EU], 18 percent, dissent: 7.3), and to a lesser degree by Dutch 
catch-all parties (VVD, 19 percent, dissent: 4.3; PvdA, 23 percent, dissent: 5.0), the Greek 
party Syriza (23 percent, dissent: 7.1) and by German parties (CDU/CSU and SPD, both 23 
percent, dissent 3.2 and 2.8). With the exception of German parties, all of these catch-all par-
ties experience quite substantial amounts of internal dissent about EU integration.  
 
Pro-EU catch-all parties that do not use silencing strategies were only found in three of the 
analysed countries, namely Austria, Greece and Portugal. Interestingly, the mobilizing parties 
(with the exception of the Portuguese Partido Socialista) are strongly united on the question of 
EU integration. In Austria, the two leading catch-all parties mention Europe in 41 percent 
(ÖVP, dissent: 1.9; SPÖ, dissent: 2.8) of their press releases, and together with the Euroscep-
tic BZÖ they are the leading EU mobilizers. Interestingly, the large Eurosceptic FPÖ men-
tions Europe in only 28 percent of their press releases. In Portugal, the large parties are among 
the strongest mobilizers on EU-related topics (Aliança Portugal: 61 percent, dissent: 2.7, Par-
tido Socialista: 42 percent, dissent: 3.7). Finally, in Greece, it is the Conservative Nea 
Dimokratia (ND, dissent: 2.6) that belongs to the strongest EU agenda-setters (41 percent) 
	
	
whereas the internally divided Syriza, the second catch-all party in Greece, which experts 
rated as balanced in reference to EU integration, only has a share of 23 percent.  
 
Issue dimension: Distinct or similar issue emphasis of pro-EU parties? 
To study whether pro-European parties emphasize their own EU-related issues or share com-
mon issues with Eurosceptics, we rely on the Duncan index of similarity. High values on this 
index indicate that two parties debate similar issues, whereas low values show distinct issue 
foci. To test whether pro- and anti-EU parties as such differ in their issue emphasis, we rely 
on QAP correlations and ask if differences in party positions (indicated by high values) are 
associated with differences in issue emphasis (indicated by low values). Negative correlations 
thus show that pro- and anti-EU parties talk past each other.  
 
Table 2 indicates country differences. In five countries (AT, F, GR, UK, PT) party positions 
are not related to issue emphasis, which means that pro- and anti-EU parties are not systemat-
ically separated by their focus on different issues. In Germany and the Netherlands, pro- and 
anti-EU parties put different issues on their agendas and thus talk past each other, as indicated 
by the negative significant correlations. 
 
# Table 2 about here # 
   
As the results so far only indicate that in most countries there is no general divide between 
pro- and anti-EU parties issue-wise, they do not show which parties put the same and which 
parties put distinct issues on the agenda. To obtain this information, we use the Duncan index 
as a distance measure between parties, visualizing it with a network algorithm that draws the 
parties close to each other that emphasize similar issues and separates those parties that have 
distinct issue foci (force atlas II, Gephi). Figure 2 reveals three groups of countries. In the first 
	
	
group composed of Germany and the Netherlands, pro-EU parties as such (as also shown by 
QAP correlations) emphasize different issues compared to Eurosceptics. A second group con-
sists of Austria, Greece and Portugal. In these countries we find common issue emphasis in all 
parties (with the exception of the nationalists in Greece [XA]). Finally, the United Kingdom 
and France constitute a third group. In these countries, pro-EU catch-all parties emphasize 
issues similar to those emphasized by Eurosceptics, whereas smaller pro-EU parties are 
pushed to the margins. For the UK, this results in a constellation in which the Conservatives 
and the Labour party campaign on issues similar to those adopted by UKIP and BNP, whereas 
the Greens and the Liberal Democrats put different issues on the agenda. Summing up, we see 
that most pro-European catch-all parties (those with strong and weak internal dissent) hardly 
avoid the topics of the Eurosceptics. Pro-European catch-all parties keep their distinct issue 
foci in only two countries. 
 
# Figure 2 about here # 
 
Position dimension: Hold, adoption or blurring strategies of pro-EU parties? 
To test whether pro-EU parties actually choose hold over adoption strategies, in other words if 
EU support outweighs EU critique in their public communication (H2a), we use the EU eval-
uation index. This index is based on our content analysis data and ranges from -1 (strong Eu-
roscepticism) to + 1 (strong EU support). We expect that those parties which are rated as hav-
ing similar EU positions by experts (CHES data) also express similar EU evaluations in their 
public EU communication, i.e. that pro- (anti-) EU parties communicate in support of (in op-
position to) the EU. This relationship is indicated by positive QAP correlations.  
 
The results shown in Table 3 support the idea that pro- and anti-EU parties differ in their EU 
communication, i.e. that similarity of party positions as judged by experts is accompanied by 
	
	
similarity in voiced EU positions in our content analysis data. This is indicated by positive, 
statistically significant QAP results in six out of seven countries. A closer look at the data 
supports our expectation that Eurosceptics express more criticism than pro-EU parties which, 
in sum, is a strong indicator for the prevalence of hold strategies (H2a). But there is one dis-
turbing result: a negative moderate correlation in Portugal, which indicates that similarity in 
positions judged by experts is not reflected in similarity in public communication. Portugal 
appears to be a particular case as all parties here strongly support the EU in their public com-
munication —even though the CDU was rated as EU-critical by experts in the CHES survey 
(Bakker et al., 2015).  
 
# Table 3 about here # 
 
Nevertheless, three objections must be examined in more detail. First, so far we only know 
that pro- and anti-EU parties differ in their public EU evaluations, but we do not know to 
what extent (i.e. do all of them criticize (support) EU integration more or less strongly?). Fig-
ure 3 shows the range of positions voiced in the seven countries included in the study. This 
figure demonstrates that clear-cut pro-European positions are voiced by at least one party in 
five of our seven countries (AT, F, GER, PT, UK), whereas in two countries, Greece and the 
Netherlands, pro-European positions only receive lukewarm support and Eurosceptic posi-
tions are forcefully put forward. We thus see tendencies for adoption in Greece and the Neth-
erlands.  
 
# Figure 3 about here #  
 
	
	
Second, although we can show that similarity in party positions judged by experts coincides 
with similarity in public communication, this association is far from perfect (e.g. in Greece), 
which leaves room for single parties’ adoption strategies. A closer look at pro-European 
catch-all parties shows that some of them adhere to adoption strategies. These parties either 
openly criticize EU integration even though they are judged balanced by experts (Syriza, GR: 
-0.28) or they show only ‘lukewarm’ support even though they are classified as clearly pro-
European by experts (VVD, NL: 0.05; Labour, UK: 0.06). 
 
Third, pro-European parties have another strategic option, blurring, which does not show up 
in the evaluation index. Blurring is defined here as the avoidance of EU evaluations or as the 
formulation of balanced statements from which no clear-cut EU evaluation can be derived (for 
the results, see the online appendix). Among our pro-European catch-all parties, we can iden-
tify four that strongly adhere to blurring strategies: the French UMP which avoids any EU 
evaluation at all; the Conservatives in the UK which evaluate the EU in only 33% of their EU-
related press releases and the two Greek mainstream parties which avoid evaluations in 80% 
(ND) and close to 70% (Syriza) of their EU-related press releases.  
 
Our results thus confirm that catch-all parties with strong internal dissent are prone to choose 
adoption or blurring strategies (H2b). The data show that both strategies are employed. Adop-
tion strategies thereby do not refer to a black-white divide between expert judgements and 
party communication, but rather to a gradual deviation. Among the strongly divided pro-
European catch-all parties, there are only two (PS, France; PvdA, NL) that neither use blur-
ring nor adoption strategies. However, as shown before, these parties also tend towards silenc-
ing on the topic dimension. In contrast, among united catch-all parties, adoption and blurring 
strategies are rare—with the Greek ND being the only exception.  
 
	
	
Variations in countries’ politicization as a result of parties’ strategies 
How do parties’ strategies regarding topics, issues and positions affect a country’s politiciza-
tion? Figure 4 summarizes our results on the country level. Regarding the first politicization 
dimension, topic salience, the figure shows that in all of the examined countries, parties 
communicate about Europe. The average EU salience on the country level6 varies between 25 
percent (UK) and 56 percent (PT). Not surprisingly, in those countries where silencing strate-
gies of (some) pro-EU catch-all parties (grey shading) are most pronounced, we find the low-
est average salience (GER, GR, F, UK). In the Netherlands, it seems that moderate silencing 
tendencies of catch-all parties are partially compensated by the other parties. Finally, coun-
tries where pro-EU catch-all parties do not follow silencing strategies tend to have higher sa-
lience values (PT, AT, black shading)—with Portugal standing out in particular.  
 
Regarding the issue focus, our results reveal that in two of our countries (GER, NL) pro- and 
anti-European parties talk past each other (triangle, Fig. 4), whereas in the other countries 
similar issue foci are employed (diamond, Fig. 4). This similar issue focus leads to a common 
debate among all parties in Portugal, Austria and Greece, whereas in the UK and France, it is 
catch-all parties that—despite their silencing strategies—employ issue emphasis similar to the 
Eurosceptics in their sparse communication, whereas smaller pro-EU parties emphasize their 
own EU-related issues.  
 
Looking at these two aspects, we judge Portugal as the most politicized country regarding EU 
integration. However, our third politicization dimension, which deals with the range of posi-
tions formulated, reveals another picture (y-axis). We find the broadest range in the United 
Kingdom (range 1.2 out of a maximum of 2) and France (range 1.0) and the lowest in Portu-
gal (0.27), followed by Germany (0.69), Greece (0.7), Austria (.81) and the Netherlands 
(0.95). However, the range alone does not tell us whether we can observe clear-cut positions 
	
	
supporting or contradicting the EU or whether parties offer only more or less EU-friendly 
(EU-critical) information. In most of the countries in our sample, contrasting positions are 
voiced (see Figure 3)—especially in the United Kingdom and France where we find clear-cut 
pro- and anti-EU positions. There is also a second group of countries where we find dissimilar 
evaluations; however, in these countries either the supportive or critical side avoids extreme 
positions (NL: -0.69 to 0.27; AT: -0.27 to 0.54). The remaining three countries tend to have a 
one-sided debate (PT, GR, GER, indicated by the ‘1’ in Figure 4). This becomes most visible 
in Portugal where all parties more or less support EU integration. To a lesser degree, this is 
also the case in Germany where only the newly founded right-wing AfD and the Linke formu-
late moderate EU opposition (-0.13; -0.14). In Greece, in contrast, we find a one-sided debate 
that extends into the Eurosceptic side (GR: -0.5 to 0.2). 
 
Looking at all three politicization dimensions at the same time uncovers a noticeable relation-
ship. It is not only that we fail to find high salience, common debates between pro- and anti-
EU parties and strong opinion polarization in any of the examined countries, but it seems that 
at least two of these politicization dimensions contradict each other in the light of parties’ 
strategies: high salience is accompanied by low opinion polarization, whereas low salience is 
found in systems with party conflict. The strength of this relation is shown by the regression 
line in Figure 4 which explains 63 percent of the variance that we observe between countries. 
Taking this finding into account, we regard Austria as the most politicized country in our 
sample, although it does not lead on all dimensions. It shows the second highest average sali-
ence, no silencing strategies of pro-EU parties, a common debate among pro- and anti-EU 
parties and a moderate level of opinion polarization. All other countries miss out on at least 
one of the politicization dimensions: catch-all parties in the United Kingdom and France fail 
to make the topic of Europe visible and partly adhere to adoption or blurring strategies; parties 
in Portugal do not voice diverging positions; those in Greece tend to produce a low-salience, 
	
	
one-sided debate and those in the Netherlands talk past each other issue-wise. It is only in 
Germany that no indicator points towards politicization: low salience is combined with a di-
vided issue focus and a one-sided debate.  
 
# Figure 4 about here # 
 
Conclusion 
Pro-European parties’ communication in the face of a Eurosceptic challenge has four charac-
teristics. First, with the exception of Germany, we find that pro-European parties as such do 
not differ (anymore) from Eurosceptics in their willingness to attach salience to the topic of 
EU integration, which leads us to reject H1a. However, it is specific pro-European parties—
namely catch-all parties facing internal dissent—that have opted for silencing strategies (see 
the UK, France and, to a lesser degree, the Netherlands and Greece), which supports H1b. In 
these countries, mobilization on EU-related topics occurs, although catch-all parties do not or 
hardly get involved. 
 
Second, pro-European parties in general do not shy away from discussing issues similar to 
those discussed by Eurosceptics, with the exception of Germany and the Netherlands where 
we find distinct issue foci between pro- and anti-EU parties. This similarity of issue focus is 
most pronounced in Austria, Greece and Portugal, where all parties campaign on the same 
issues. In the UK and France, it is pro-European mainstream parties (if they speak up at all) 
and Eurosceptics that converge issue-wise, while smaller pro-European parties diverge. Third, 
pro-European parties largely choose hold over adoption strategies (support for H2a). Howev-
er, it is once again catch-all parties with strong internal dissent that are prone to choose adop-
tion and blurring strategies, which supports H2b. Fourth, our results show that silencing and 
adoption / blurring strategies go hand in hand – most strongly affecting catch-all parties fac-
	
	
ing internal dissent: if parties choose silencing strategies, they are more likely to also apply 
adoption or blurring strategies in their sparse communication, one of the most vivid examples 
being the Conservatives in France (UMP).  
 
Our research has shown that party strategies shape politicization within each country. Our 
findings thus point to a noticeable relationship: the higher the salience of Europe within a 
country, the less conflictual is party communication. In countries where clear-cut EU evalua-
tions are formulated, the topic of Europe is pushed to the margins. Taking this relationship 
into account, it is not that surprising that no country completely fulfils all dimensions of polit-
icization. There is only one country that scores high on all dimensions: Austria. Germany oc-
cupies the opposite position as we do not find indications for politicization on any dimension 
for Germany.  
 
Has the Eurosceptic challenge been taken up by pro-European parties or have the challengers 
themselves already won the struggle? Our evaluation is mixed. On the one hand, we see that 
internally divided pro-European catch-all parties in major EU countries (namely UMP, PS in 
France; Syriza in Greece; PvdA and VVD in the Netherlands and Conservatives and Labour 
in the UK) do not only avoid talking about Europe but also mostly obscure their EU positions 
or adopt part of the Eurosceptic rhetoric. This is problematic as it hampers a full-fledged de-
bate on EU integration with pro and contra positions being voiced.  
 
On the other hand, our results also show that not all pro-European parties shy away from the 
Eurosceptic challenge. In the midst of the EU’s financial and debt crisis, major pro-EU parties 
have vigorously defended their pro-EU stances (ÖVP and SPÖ in Austria, PS and PSD-CDS	
in Portugal and, to a lesser degree as salience is low, CDU/CSU and SPD in Germany and 
PvdA in the Netherlands).  
	
	
 
Three caveats regarding our research need to be mentioned. First, the degree of politicization 
as we have conceptualized it is always a relative concept as we compare against the other 
countries in the sample. Such a conceptualization, however, does not answer the question re-
garding how much salience, topic similarity or opinion polarization is needed in order to 
speak of full politicization. Second, it would be helpful to extend our country sample by in-
cluding, for example, Eastern European countries which might possibly follow other dynam-
ics. Third, our approach rests on a detailed description of party strategies and the resulting 
politicization and, as such, cannot control for alternative explanations—be they on the party 
or country level.   
 
Our study opens up at least two paths for future research. First, as our research has shown that 
there is not a uniform response to the Eurosceptic challenge on the side of pro-European par-
ties, future research needs to increase our understanding of pro-European parties’ strategic 
choices. We have thereby focussed on the (vote-wise) most important parties in each country, 
i.e. the catch-all parties. However, research needs to also take into account the smaller pro-
European parties. Furthermore, more explanatory factors need to be systematically tested in 
order to understand variation in the strategic responses of pro-European parties. A better un-
derstanding of parties’ strategic choices will increase our knowledge concerning the differ-
ences and similarities among countries regarding their politicization. Why, for example, do 
we find such a strong similarity between the ever-Eurosceptic United Kingdom and the classic 
engine of EU integration, France? 
 
Second, we need to analyse whether and under which conditions mass media actually take up 
this input of parties and how they convert it into a societal debate. Our research has shown 
that mass media are either confronted with high salience combined with low conflict or with 
	
	
high conflict and low salience. This input contradicts the logic of mass media because conflict 
is a crucial driver for salience in such media (e.g. Schuck et al., 2011). Understanding the 
conditions of mass media’s responses to parties’ input is all the more important, as mass me-
dia are those who either show the elite’s struggle to the average citizens or hide it from them.  
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Notes
																																								 																				
1.	Research	on	position	blurring	(e.g.	Rovny,	2012)	focuses	on	obscuring	one’s	position	on	specific	policy	issues.	
We	have	taken	up	this	idea	but	search	for	blurring	regarding	the	topic	dimension,	i.e.	the	evaluation	of	EU	
integration	as	such.		
2.	The	search	string	contains	the	following	key	words:	‘Europ*,	europ*,	EU,	EP,	EZB,	EIB,	ESM,	EFSF,	EFSM,	
EuGH,	EAD,	EWSA,	EIF,	EDSB,	EWU,	Troika,	Frontex,	FRONTEX,	constitutional	treaty’.		
3.	A	detailed	overview	of	the	reliability	scores	is	available	from	the	authors	upon	request.	
4.	The	Duncan	index	of	dissimilarity	is	equivalent	to	the	more	widely	used	Pedersen	index	on	electoral	volatility	
(Pedersen,	1979).	The	formula	is	as	follows:		 12 𝑝!!𝑃! − 𝑝!!𝑃!!!!! 	
where	n	is	the	number	of	issues,	pi1	and	pi2	the	number	of	EU-related	press	releases	devoted	to	issue	i	by	party	
1	and	party	2,	and	P1	and	P2	the	total	number	of	EU-related	press	releases	published	by	party	1	and	party	2.		
5.	The	index	was	built	as	follows:	1	‘Voicing	of	specific	and	general	EU	support	(both	indicators	positive)’;	0.75	
‘Voicing	of	general	EU	support	(EUEVAL:	n.a.	or	balanced)’;	0.5	‘Voicing	of	general	EU	support	and	specific	Eu-
roscepticism’;	0.25	‘Voicing	of	specific	EU	support	(INTEGEVAL:	n.a.	or	balanced)’;	-0.25	‘Voicing	of	specific	
Euroscepticism	(INTEGEVAL:	n.a.	or	balanced)’;	-0.5	‘Voicing	of	general	Euroscepticism	and	specific	EU	support’;	
-0.75	‘Voicing	of	general	Euroscepticism	(EUEVAL:	n.a.	or	balanced)’;	-1	‘Voicing	of	specific	and	general	Euro-
scepticism	(both	negative)’.	
6.	Country-level	salience	is	measured	as	the	share	of	EU-related	press	releases	of	each	party	within	a	country	
divided	by	the	number	of	parties	within	a	country.	We	have	not	weighted	this	salience	measure	by	vote	share	
as	we	specifically	focus	on	the	large	catch-all	parties	in	our	detailed	description.		
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Figure 1. Pro-EU parties’ strategic repertoire. 
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Figure 2. The relation between pro-EU and anti-EU parties regarding their issue focus. 
Note: Network visualization based on Force Atlas II, Gephi (Scaling: 1.00000; Edge Weight: 7); 
Colours: dark grey = Eurosceptics (EU position <3), light grey (EU position ≥ 3 and ≤ 5); white = pro-European 
Basis: EU positions (Bakker et al., 2015), Duncan index (issue distribution from the author’s own study)  
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Figure 3. Range of opinions towards EU integration in parties’ press releases. 
Basis: press releases with an EU evaluation; N (AT) = 530; N (F) = 120; N (GER) = 175; N (GR) = 201; N (NL) = 120; N 
(PT) = 231; N (UK) = 142. 
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Figure 4. Degree of Politicization.
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Note: Topic (1) x-axis (average share of EU-related press releases); (2) grey shading = silencing strategies of (some) 
pro-EU catch-all parties; black = no silencing strategies of pro-EU catch-all parties; Issue: diamond = common de-
bate; triangle = divided debate; Position: (1) y-axis (range of opinions within a country); 1 = one-sided debate with 
either pro or contra positions dominating; Regression model: Relationship between opinion polarization and salience 
explains 63 percent of the variance. 	
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Table 1. Distinct topic strategies of pro-European parties? 
 Pearson r Significance 
Austria -0.13 n.s.(0.27) 
France -0.03 n.s.(0.46) 
Germany 0.64 * (0.04) 
Greece 0.05 n.s.(0.28) 
Netherlands -0.14 n.s. (0.21) 
Portugal 0.10 n.s.(0.30) 
UK -0.25 n.s. (0.10) 
Note: QAP correlations (Δ salience [0;1 = large difference]; Δ EU position [0;6 = large difference]). 
Basis: EU positions (Bakker et al., 2015), salience: share of EU related press releases / all press releases (own study). 
Significance level: n.s. = not significant; ✝p <.1; *p < .05; **p < .01. 
	
	
 
  
Table 2. Distinct issue foci of pro-European parties? 
 Pearson’s r Significance 
Austria 0.14 n.s.(0.34) 
France 0.08 n.s.(0.41) 
Germany -0.52 ✝(0.05) 
Greece -0.09 n.s.(0.29) 
Netherlands -0.29 ✝(0.07) 
Portugal -0.43 n.s.(0.17) 
UK 0.04 n.s.(0.47) 
Note: QAP correlations (Duncan index [0;1 = proximity]; Δ EU position [0;6 =difference]); 
Basis: EU positions (Bakker et al., 2015), Duncan index (issue distribution own study) 
Significance level: n.s. = not significant; ✝p < .1]; *p < .05; **p < .01. 
	
	
	
 
Table 3. Distinct position strategies of pro-European parties? 
 Pearson’s r Significance 
Austria 0.71 * (0.04) 
France 0.79 * (0.03) 
Germany 0.72 * (0.04) 
Greece 0.61 ** (0.00) 
Netherlands 0.79 **(0.00) 
Portugal -0.40 ** (0.00) 
UK 0.74 * (0.01) 
Note: QAP correlations (Δ EU evaluation in press releases [0;2 = difference]; Δ EU position [0;6 = difference]); 
Basis: EU positions (CHES, Bakker et al., 2015), evaluations in press releases (own study) 
Significance level: n.s. = not significant; ✝p < .1]; *p < .05; **p < .01. 
